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Is Aesthetic Experience Possible?
Sherri Irvin
On several current views, aesthetic appreciation or experience involves second-order 
awareness of one’s own mental processes. Matthew Kieran says, ‘When we truly appre-
ciate a work, we appreciate its pictorial composition, the arc of the lines, the shad-
ing, the foreshadowing, the ways in which the artistry shapes and guides our responses’ 
(Kieran 2005: 213; emphasis added). Gary Iseminger suggests that ‘[s] omeone is appre-
ciating a state of affairs just in case she or he is valuing for its own sake the experiencing 
of that state of affairs’, and is thus in ‘the aesthetic state of mind’ (Iseminger 2005: 99; 
emphasis in original). Jerrold Levinson suggests that valuing an experience in itself, in 
Iseminger’s sense, might be cashed out as ‘tak[ing] satisfaction in such an activity for its 
own sake while, at some level, endorsing or approving doing so’ (Levinson forthcoming; 
emphasis in original). Thus, in Levinson’s version, we have the experiencing of a state 
of affairs, the taking of satisfaction in this experiencing, and the endorsing of one’s 
satisfaction.
Levinson ultimately holds that higher-order valuing of one’s own experience is only 
one variety of aesthetic experience, though. He says, ‘Aesthetic experience is experi-
ence involving aesthetic perception of some object, grounded in aesthetic attention to 
the object, and in which there is a positive hedonic, affective or evaluative response to 
the perception itself or the content of that perception’ (Levinson forthcoming; empha-
sis in original). Since a positive response to the content of the perception is sufficient, 
second-order awareness is not required for all forms of aesthetic experience. Noël 
Carroll, like Levinson, incorporates second-order awareness into his account of aes-
thetic experience, but without making it a requirement: ‘attention with understand-
ing . . . to the ways in which [the work’s formal and aesthetic properties] engage our 
sensibilities and imagination’ is one variety of aesthetic experience, but simply attend-
ing to those formal and aesthetic properties themselves, without any second-order 
awareness, is another (Carroll 2002: 167).
But what if it turns out that we don’t have introspective access to the processes by 
which our aesthetic responses are produced? What if we are, in fact, very poor judges 
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of how the artistry of a work ‘shapes and guides our responses’, as Kieran puts it?1 There 
is good reason to think that we are, in fact, poor judges of such things. In a famous 
paper, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) surveyed results suggesting that we are ignorant of 
major swathes of what happens in our minds and why, though we nonetheless make 
confident claims about these matters. We are unaware of crucial factors that enable us 
to solve problems, that cause us to prefer one item to another, and that significantly 
influence our major life decisions. As Nisbett and Wilson sum things up, ‘Subjective 
reports about higher mental processes are sometimes correct, but even the instances 
of correct report are not due to direct introspective awareness. Instead, they are due 
to the incidentally correct employment of a priori causal theories’ (233). Though we 
believe that we are consulting our introspective memories when we explain our judge-
ments, decisions, or actions, we are in fact constructing post hoc rationalizations.
Nisbett and Wilson’s paper triggered many subsequent studies with troubling impli-
cations for the domains of aesthetic experience and judgement.2 I will describe what 
I take to be the problems revealed by these studies and consider the implications of 
these problems for our understanding of aesthetic experience and appreciation.
2.1 The Bad News, and a Little Good News
Here are the problems, as I  see them. First, irrelevance:  subjects’ aesthetic or 
proto-aesthetic preferences are strongly affected by conditions that are aesthetically 
irrelevant. So, for instance, Cutting (2003) was able to alter his subjects’ preferences 
among Impressionist paintings simply by manipulating how frequently various paint-
ings appeared in their environments.3 Even more strikingly, when Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977) asked subjects in a discount store to rate the quality of four pairs of stockings 
that were in fact identical, spatial position had a large effect on rankings: 12 per cent 
of subjects preferred the stockings on the left, 17 per cent those second from the left, 
31 per cent those second from the right, and 40 per cent those on the right. Similar 
effects were seen for nightgowns.4 Position, obviously, is irrelevant as a reason to prefer 
one pair of stockings or one nightgown to another. Finally, Yamada (2009) suggests 
that a reversal of preference can be achieved by asking subjects different questions 
about the stimuli. Subjects were asked to compare an abstract and a representational 
painting. When asked to verbalize their reasons for liking the paintings, they preferred 
 1 In section 2.2, I discuss a weaker interpretation of Kieran’s requirement.
 2 See also related discussion in Lopes (this volume). In section 2.2 I discuss the relevance of these studies 
specifically to the aesthetic domain.
 3 Subjects tended to prefer paintings to which they were exposed more frequently. We must use caution in 
seeing Cutting’s study as providing evidence of an irrelevance problem: the results may have been due not to 
a mere exposure effect, but to subjects’ having more opportunity to grasp the genuinely valuable features of 
the paintings. Kieran, Meskin, and Moore (unpublished) found that exposure decreased subjects’ liking for 
bad paintings (by Thomas Kinkade).
 4 Li and Epley (2009) discuss the relevance of memory to position effects and show that serial position has 
a different effect on choices among desirable options than on choices among undesirable options.
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the representational painting. When asked to verbalize their reasons for disliking the 
paintings, they preferred the abstract painting. Which question one is asked, however, 
is irrelevant as a reason for preferring one to the other.
The subject’s own characteristics, too, can be a source of irrelevance effects. 
Right-handed subjects judge that paintings with visual interest on the right are ‘more 
aesthetically pleasing’, while left-handed subjects prefer visual interest to the left 
(McLaughlin et al. 1983: 149). One’s handedness is clearly irrelevant to the value of art-
works one may be judging.
The second problem is coarse-grainedness. Aesthetically relevant aspects of a work 
fail to have the expected effects on people’s judgements. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
gave subjects a selection from John Updike’s novel Rabbit, Run. Some subjects read 
the entire selection, while others read versions that had various significant passages 
deleted. However, subjects in all conditions rated the selection as having the same 
degree of emotional impact. This suggests that the subjects’ response to the work was 
not responsive to specific details in the way that artists presumably hope when they 
carefully refine their works.5
Studies of the visual perception of paintings, too, support the idea that much aes-
thetic judgement is coarse-grained. Locher et  al. (2007) found that ratings made 
after 100 millisecond exposures to paintings are highly correlated with ratings made 
after unlimited exposure. Eye movement analysis showed that initial reactions dur-
ing unlimited exposure were based on exploration of only 27 per cent of the work. 
Moreover, in the entirety of the unlimited exposure phase ‘approximately 54% of the 
pictorial fields were not directly fixated or did not receive sustained fixation’ (p. 75). 
Subjects neglected large portions of the artwork, and their ratings were based primar-
ily on details cursorily taken in during very early phases of exposure, and not substan-
tially updated after fuller study.
The third problem is ignorance. Subjects tend not to know whether a particular con-
dition has affected their judgement. Subjects in the Rabbit, Run study believed, incor-
rectly, that the passages that were deleted in some conditions influenced, or would 
have influenced, their judgements of emotional impact. Subjects in another study by 
Nisbett and Wilson mistakenly believed that their judgements of a documentary had 
been altered by a distracting noise outside the theatre, but in fact, their ratings were 
the same as those of subjects who saw the documentary without the noise. Subjects 
in the stocking study were unaware that the position of the stockings had affected 
their judgements; indeed, they were incredulous at the suggestion.6 In some studies, 
the ignorance extends even more deeply: subjects who are induced to change their 
 5 Nisbett and Wilson’s interest was in people’s poor understanding of which aspects of the work contribute 
to their responses; they were not aiming to demonstrate coarse-grainedness. It is possible that their measure 
was itself too coarse-grained to capture the nuances of subjects’ responses.
 6 ‘[W] hen asked directly about a possible effect of the position of the article, virtually all subjects denied it, 
usually with a worried glance at the interviewer suggesting that they felt either that they had misunderstood 
the question or were dealing with a madman’ (Nisbett and Wilson 1977: 244).
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evaluation of something often fail to recognize not only what has been responsible for 
the change, but even that the change has happened at all: they incorrectly recall hav-
ing held their current evaluation all along.7 Subjects are also ignorant of the factors 
that influence problem solving: in a classic experiment (Maier 1931), subjects had to 
find multiple solutions to a problem, and one of the more difficult solutions involved 
swinging a cord. Very few subjects found this solution before an experimenter ‘casu-
ally put one of the cords in motion’ (Nisbett and Wilson 1977: 241), but nearly everyone 
found it within 45 seconds thereafter. Two-thirds of subjects were completely unaware 
that the cue had helped them solve the problem. Even on direct questioning subjects 
are sometimes adamant that they were not influenced by a factor that, statistically, 
clearly had a strong effect on most.8
The fourth problem is confabulation. People are unaware that they lack good intro-
spective access to the factors that influence their judgements, and they provide con-
fabulated ‘explanations’ of their choices. In the stocking study, subjects attributed their 
ratings to differences in the ‘knit, weave, sheerness, elasticity, or workmanship of the 
stockings’, though the stockings were in fact identical in these respects. Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977, esp. p. 241) report that such spurious explanations are common. Subjects 
apparently rely on theories about which factors are relevant to judgement in fabricat-
ing such explanations.
The fifth problem is explanation-induced instability. When subjects try to report on 
the mental processes that have influenced their judgements, this changes what they 
report preferring: a subject asked to explain her preference is likely to say that she likes 
a comical poster better than a poster of an Impressionist painting, but subjects not 
asked to explain tend to hold the opposite preference (Wilson et al. 1993). Johansson 
et al. (2005) asked subjects to report their preference between two faces, X and Y. Some 
subjects who reported preferring X would later be asked to explain why they (alleg-
edly) preferred Y. For the subject even to notice that she was being asked to explain 
a preference that she did not hold was rare; and her explanation would often invoke 
features of Y that were not also possessed by X, showing that she was not reporting on 
an introspective process that generated the initial preference. Moreover, after being 
asked to ‘explain’ her ‘preference’ for Y, the subject typically would express a preference 
for Y if subsequently asked to compare X and Y again (Hall and Johansson 2008). The 
study described above, in which preferences shifted depending on whether subjects 
were asked to describe what they liked or disliked about paintings, suggests that sub-
jects rely on the easiest factors to verbalize: positive and negative reasons are easier 
 7 Nisbett and Wilson (1977: 235–7), discussing Bem and McConnell (1970) and Goethals and Reckman 
(1973).
 8 This is particularly true of the well-known bystander research by Latané and Darley (1970), who demon-
strated that people are much less likely to offer help when they believe that many others are also in a position 
to do so. See Nisbett and Wilson (1977: 241) for discussion.
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to articulate in relation to figurative paintings than in relation to abstract paintings 
(Yamada 2009).
The sixth problem is explanation-induced deterioration. When preferences change 
as a result of explanation, they are lower in quality from two perspectives. First, the 
preferences are less likely to match those of experts.9 Second, subjects are less likely to 
be satisfied by their choices. Subjects who chose the comical poster were less likely to 
have hung it, reported liking it less, and were willing to sell it for a lower price (Wilson 
et al. 1993).
There are two shreds of slightly better news. The first is correct explanation. People 
frequently offer correct explanations of their choices. The experiments in which peo-
ple offered false ‘explanations’ were designed to exploit discrepancies between sub-
jects’ choice processes and the explanations they were likely to offer. People aren’t 
usually asked to perform absurd tasks like ranking the quality of identical stockings. In 
a real-world choice situation, actual differences in knit, weave, sheerness, and elasticity 
presumably would affect subjects’ rankings, and they would not be forced to invent a 
story about these features.
However, the comfort we should take from this is limited. First, many correct 
explanations seem to be produced through theorizing rather than introspection, but 
subjects nonetheless believe they are offering introspective reports. Confabulation 
remains an issue. Second, if position effects are so strong in the absurd choice situation, 
they are presumably also present, though perhaps less pronounced, in ordinary situa-
tions. Irrelevance and ignorance thus remain in play: subjects’ responses are driven in 
part by irrelevant factors of which they are unaware.
The second shred of slightly better news, call it differential susceptibility, is that some 
people, particularly experts in a domain, are less susceptible to some of these effects.10 
The results of the studies are consistent with the existence of a subgroup of people who 
are better at filtering out aesthetically irrelevant information and/or recognizing what 
has truly affected their choices.11 The studies leave open the possibility of a minority 
with significant introspective access to their choices. A third of the subjects in Maier’s 
(1931) problem-solving study involving the swinging cord reported, correctly, that the 
experimenter’s bumping the rope had helped them solve the problem.12 Fleming et al. 
 9 Wilson and Schooler (1991) made this finding in studies about preferences for strawberry jam and for 
college courses.
 10 E.g., Carlson and Bond (2006) and Coupey et al. (1998) note that experts are less susceptible to prefer-
ence instability due to irrelevant shifts in context.
 11 However, Mantonakis et al. (2009) found that while both high- and low-knowledge subjects were sus-
ceptible to a rather steep primacy effect in wine preferences (that is, a tendency to prefer the wine presented 
first in a series), high-knowledge subjects were also subject to a recency effect (tendency to prefer the wine 
presented last).
 12 As Nisbett and Wilson (1977: 241) note, however, these correct reports may have been guesses based on 
external theories of problem solving rather than introspection.
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(2010) suggest that there are individual differences in introspective awareness of men-
tal processes, and that these correspond to differences in brain structure.13
To sum up, here are the problems and bits of slightly better news.
The bad news:
 1. Irrelevance: aesthetic responses are determined in part by aesthetically irrel-
evant conditions.
 2. Coarse-grainedness: aesthetic responses are excessively coarse-grained, failing 
to take into account aesthetically relevant aspects of the work.
 3. Ignorance: we don’t know what causes our aesthetic responses.
 4. Confabulation: we don’t know that we don’t know what causes our aesthetic 
responses, and we offer confabulated ‘explanations’.
 5. Explanation-induced instability: when we try to offer explanations, this changes 
our preferences.
 6. Explanation-induced deterioration: preferences formed after explanation are 
lower in quality.
The slightly better news:
 1. Correct explanation: people often explain their choices correctly, though mostly 
through theorizing rather than introspection. This good news has limited abil-
ity to mitigate the bad news, since subjects still believe they are introspecting.
 2. Differential susceptibility: there seem to be subgroups of people who are less 
susceptible to some of the problems, and who have greater introspective access 
to their mental processes.
2.2 Why These Are Problems for Aesthetics
In the studies discussed above, subjects were asked to report on liking or disliking of 
an artwork or other object, to express a preference between objects, to make choices 
about whether to acquire or keep an object, or to make judgements of quality regard-
ing non-art objects. How are such measures related to aesthetic experience and 
appreciation?
Liking, preference, and choice might come apart from aesthetic judgement in par-
ticular cases. I nonetheless regard these measures as at least proto-aesthetic, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary. First, there is surely an intimate relationship 
between an experience of aesthetic value and an experience of liking, pleasure, or pref-
erence, even if the correlation is not perfect. Traditional accounts of aesthetic value 
 13 Specifically, introspective awareness is correlated with gray-matter volume and white-matter micro-
structure in the anterior prefrontal cortex (Fleming et al. 2010). Subjects were asked to perform a difficult 
task, and then to rate their confidence in their answers. Subjects were rated as high in introspection if they 
were significantly more confident about their correct answers than their incorrect answers.
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have often defined it in terms of the production of pleasurable states (e.g., Bell 1914; 
Hume 1757/1985).
Second, consider the specific tasks the subjects performed. They were asked to 
‘look at each pair and judge which image they liked best’ (Cutting 2003: 328); ‘choose 
the piece they liked [or disliked] the most’ (Yamada 2009: 1141); ‘choose the mem-
ber of each pair they found more aesthetically pleasing’ (McLaughlin et al. 1983: 149); 
rate ‘the pleasingness of ’ each image (Locher et al. 2007: 63); rate ‘how much they 
liked each poster’ and ‘choose whichever one [they liked] the best’ (Wilson et  al. 
1993: 333 and 334); ‘choos[e] which face in each pair they found most attractive’ (Hall 
and Johansson 2008: 269); say ‘what emotional impact [a literary passage] had had’ 
(Nisbett and Wilson 1977: 245); and judge a documentary with regard to ‘how inter-
esting they thought it was, how much they thought other people would be affected 
by it, and how sympathetic they found the main character to be’ (Nisbett and Wilson 
1977: 245). Most of these tasks invite subjects to focus directly on their experiential 
encounter with the object, which is of interest in relation to theories of aesthetic expe-
rience and appreciation. How ‘aesthetically pleasing’ an image is, how ‘attractive’ a 
face is, the ‘emotional impact’ of a literary passage, and ‘how interesting’ a documen-
tary is all seem directly relevant to aesthetic assessment. It is true that judgements of 
how much an image is liked, or how pleasing it is, could come apart from aesthetic 
assessment: a subject might prefer, or find more pleasing, a landscape she regards 
as aesthetically mediocre in comparison to an aesthetically superior painting of a 
rotting carcass. But Cutting’s (2003) subjects, for instance, were comparing pairs of 
Impressionist paintings with similar techniques and subject matters, so there is no 
reason to think that the factors that would separate liking from aesthetic assessment 
were in play.
Some of Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) subjects were asked to ‘say which article of cloth-
ing was the best quality’ (p. 243). Intuitively, judgements of quality in garments like 
stockings and nightgowns are not aesthetic judgements: they involve criteria related to 
both appearance and durability. But there is no obvious reason aesthetic judgements 
would be immune to position effects to which judgements of quality succumb.
In sum, preference and liking are surely correlated with, even if not identical to, aes-
thetic assessment. In the absence of reasons to expect systematic reversals of this rela-
tionship, it is reasonable to expect that factors influencing preference and liking will 
influence related aesthetic phenomena.
How do the problems outlined above cause trouble for accounts of aesthetic appre-
ciation and experience? On views requiring that artworks be correctly apprehended, it 
seems that anyone afflicted by irrelevance, and possibly also coarse-grainedness, could 
not be appreciating a work aesthetically. In cases of irrelevance, it seems the object is 
perceived through a fog of irrelevant conditions that cause viewers to misapprehend 
it. Identical stockings, seen through the haze of the position effect, seem to differ in 
weave, elasticity, and sheerness. Coarse-grainedness, on the other hand, need not 
involve false beliefs about the object: it is not false to describe several different shades 
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as ‘red’, or several different emotional timbres as ‘sad’. But it does manifest a failure to 
apprehend the object fully enough for aesthetic purposes.
Carroll’s account may imply that subjects susceptible to irrelevance are not having 
aesthetic experiences at all, even where second-order awareness is not in play. Carroll’s 
account requires ‘attention with understanding to the work’s formal and aesthetic prop-
erties and[/or] their interaction with each other and[/or] to the ways in which they 
engage our sensibilities and imagination’. Subjects in the grip of irrelevance are attend-
ing without (much) understanding. Coarse-grainedness, too, involves a troublingly 
limited degree of understanding, though perhaps not enough to disqualify subjects 
completely. Appreciation, or the aesthetic state of mind, seems to be compromised 
by these problems on Iseminger’s account as well. He says that ‘the aesthetic state of 
mind . . . is the state of mind in which, while tracking [formal and expressive] features 
(among others . . .), one finds this tracking valuable for its own sake’.14 But subjects in 
the grip of coarse-grainedness and, especially, irrelevance are not in fact tracking these 
features, though they may falsely believe that they are. Similarly, on Levinson’s view 
that ‘[a]esthetic experience is experience involving aesthetic perception of some object, 
grounded in aesthetic attention to the object’, it is unclear whether irrelevance and 
coarse-grainedness are consistent with aesthetic experience at all, since they seem to 
indicate that aesthetic attention to the object is seriously compromised or absent.
Kieran’s account does not appear to treat coarse-grainedness as disqualifying sub-
jects from aesthetic appreciation. However, the fact that we are ignorant of the pro-
cesses that cause our aesthetic responses seems to be disqualifying on this account. 
Ignorance seems to rule out the possibility that we could appreciate ‘the ways in which 
the artistry shapes and guides our responses’, as Kieran requires. In correspondence, 
Kieran has suggested a weaker reading of his requirement, on which being aware that 
one’s responses are being shaped by the work, even if one does not know how, might 
be enough. On this reading, ignorance alone would not threaten aesthetic experience, 
but the combination of ignorance and irrelevance would. For irrelevance raises the 
prospect that some (aspects) of our responses may not be caused by the work at all, but 
rather by conditions such as the way it is positioned in the museum. In combination 
with ignorance, irrelevance may prevent us from distinguishing the artistry’s contribu-
tion to our responses from the contribution of other factors, as even Kieran’s weaker 
condition seems to require.
Ignorance also calls into question the extent to which we could be valuing our expe-
riencing of a state of affairs, as Iseminger requires: for the connection between the state 
of affairs and our experiencing is unclear.
The tendency to confabulate when we attempt to explain our responses may 
not add much, other than embarrassment, to the difficulties described above. 
Explanation-induced instability and deterioration do add something, though:  they 
 14 Iseminger (2005: 103).
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suggest that the problems will not be easy to solve, and attempts to solve them may 
be harmful. An obvious way to address irrelevance, coarse-grainedness, and igno-
rance is to try to pay closer attention to what is, in fact, going on in our minds. But 
explanation-induced instability and deterioration suggest that when we try to report 
on our mental processes, this alters their course and causes deterioration in the out-
comes, undermining satisfaction.
2.3 Aesthetic Experience, Aesthetic Appreciation, 
and Deep Aesthetic Appreciation
Before considering further implications of problems with second-order awareness, 
I’d like to introduce some methodological constraints. The first is that on any accept-
able account, it must turn out that aesthetic experience and appreciation are possible. 
The answer to the question posed in my title, then, is yes. Aesthetic experience and 
appreciation are important dimensions of human life. If an account of aesthetic experi-
ence or appreciation picks out phenomena that turn out not to be empirically viable, 
we should conclude that it has picked out the wrong things. We should be wary of 
accounts of aesthetic experience and appreciation developed without consulting rel-
evant empirical evidence.15
Further, aesthetic experience and appreciation should not turn out to be rare, 
exalted states accessible only to art experts or the preternaturally gifted. Ordinary 
people have aesthetic experiences on a fairly regular basis. These include admiring 
a garden in full bloom, having one’s breath taken away by the beauty of one’s sleep-
ing child, and listening with enjoyment to music on the radio. When people attend 
to, respond to, and take pleasure in the form and content of music as they listen, sing 
along, and dance, they are responding aesthetically, even if they lack a sophisticated 
capacity to describe the elements of the music, or to explain or justify the compo-
nents of their responses.16 Similarly, ordinary people can appreciate many kinds of 
artworks, ranging from popular music to paintings in museums. Some works may be 
so complex or difficult that only a few people can appreciate them, but such works are 
the exception.
We can still distinguish everyday responses from more sophisticated aesthetic 
engagement with artworks. Indeed, there are two distinctions it will be helpful to 
make. The first is between aesthetic experience and aesthetic appreciation. In my view, 
aesthetic appreciation is focused on its object: it is appreciation of that object, and as 
such the object must be largely correctly apprehended. It is desirable, however, to have 
a more permissive account of aesthetic experience, such that one can have an aesthetic 
experience caused by an object that is seriously misunderstood, or even imagined (as 
 15 Cf. Bergeron and Lopes (2012).
 16 For an excellent discussion of dancing as an aesthetic response to music, see Shusterman (1991).
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in the case of hallucinations).17 An aesthetic experience of an artwork may turn out to 
be sufficient for aesthetic appreciation of that artwork, as long as the experience has 
involved a sufficiently accurate grasp of the artwork.18 An aesthetic experience that is 
triggered by an artwork, but in which the artwork has been seriously misunderstood, 
will not count as aesthetic appreciation of the work. The relation of aesthetic experi-
ence to aesthetic appreciation can be construed in a similar way for non-artworks.
A second distinction is between mere appreciation of an artwork and deep apprecia-
tion. Deep appreciation, which comes in degrees, is appreciation that demonstrates a 
grasp of such things as artistic technique, art-historical relations, the artist’s achieve-
ment in making the work, and the manner in which the artwork evokes cognitive, 
perceptual, and emotional responses. Deep appreciation typically involves the ability 
to offer detailed descriptions of the artwork and the achievement it manifests. Deep 
appreciation, then, requires significant background knowledge and preparedness 
which may be absent in ordinary appreciation.
I have claimed that, on an acceptable account of aesthetic appreciation, it should 
turn out that most people are capable of appreciating artworks. This constraint does 
not apply to accounts of deep appreciation: it may turn out that some, or many, people 
have never had experiences of deep appreciation. It is not elitist to acknowledge that 
when a person has made a special effort to develop competence with respect to a given 
art form, be it painting or hip hop, she will be able to appreciate the work more fully 
by virtue of her better grasp of the work itself and the art-historical relations in which 
it stands. Nor would I automatically rule out accounts on which the deepest forms of 
appreciation require a capacity that is rare or even absent in humans. Perhaps the abil-
ity to appreciate art to the very fullest extent is among humans’ many limitations.
How does introspective awareness figure in aesthetic experience, aesthetic appre-
ciation, and deep aesthetic appreciation, respectively? Introspective awareness of the 
kind called into question by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and their successors is unneces-
sary for aesthetic experience. Some awareness of one’s own perception is necessary for 
aesthetic experience—one cannot have an aesthetic experience of perceptual infor-
mation that one is unaware of taking in and processing (as when one is driving a long 
distance and ‘zones out’ for a while) (Irvin 2008a). However, the ability to observe one’s 
own mental process and understand precisely why one feels moved by a piece of music 
or a natural environment, or which aspects of the object are responsible for one’s feel-
ing, should not be required. (Second-order awareness may nonetheless be implicated 
in some forms of aesthetic experience, as Carroll and Levinson suggest.)
 17 I defend a similar notion of aesthetic experience in Irvin (2008a) and (2008b). Perhaps aesthetic experi-
ence must involve an object cognized in such-and-such a way, where the aesthetic response one has is not 
inappropriate to an object thus cognized, though the object has been cognized incorrectly. I take some inspi-
ration for this possibility from Carroll (1993).
 18 I qualify this claim to allow that an accurate grasp of the work may sometimes yield a response that is not 
apt to it, as when a work triggers an anxiety response in a viewer with a specific phobia. Perhaps a viewer in 
the grips of such a response is not appreciating the work, despite having correctly apprehended it.
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What about ordinary aesthetic appreciation? Does it require introspective awareness 
of mental processes? No. Aesthetic appreciation of an artwork requires a sufficiently 
accurate grasp of the work, and some of the problems identified above would threaten 
this: when a position effect influences one’s perception, leading one to think that two (vir-
tually) identical objects differ in specific qualities, one’s grasp of (at least one of) them is 
significantly compromised. For ordinary appreciation, though, it is sufficient to have a 
reasonable grasp of the object itself without having insight into what it is about the object 
that causes one to enjoy it or to evince a particular response to it. Aspects of the musical 
structure of an R&B song may cause me to make certain choices in how I dance, or to feel 
especially moved, but I can appreciate the music aesthetically without understanding how 
these effects are achieved or which elements of the music are responsible.
Deep aesthetic appreciation involves understanding of how the artwork achieves its 
effects, and thus significant insight into mental processes. When we learn how particular 
emotional effects in film are achieved through subtle techniques we had not previously 
noticed, this increases the depth of our appreciation.
Is the required insight into mental processes feasible, given the empirical results? The 
studies typically pose a direct challenge only to introspective memory, not to real-time 
introspective awareness, since they ask subjects to make reports after the fact. But this is 
not especially comforting; it seems unlikely that subjects who failed to report the role of 
the hint in helping to solve the cord-swinging problem were, in fact, aware of the role of 
the hint when they came up with the solution, but then forgot. Similarly, it seems unlikely 
that subjects knew that a position effect influenced them in choosing the stockings on the 
right, but then forgot this when asked to explain their choices.19
The studies show that we often lack introspective awareness of the way the mind 
brings together a variety of considerations to come up with a choice or evaluation. This 
does not imply that we have no introspective awareness at all. The biggest threat is to 
introspective awareness of processes, not of states. The studies don’t suggest that I can’t 
recognize that I am hungry, that I am sad, that I am smelling cinnamon, or that I am 
having an occurrent thought about bicycles. What is most troubling is that I may weave 
my awareness of such states into a tale about my evaluation of an object and believe 
that this tale actually explains the evaluation, when in fact it simply masks unconscious 
processing that may not have appealed to the same factors mentioned in the tale.
The studies also suggest that introspective knowledge or memory of particular states 
is often absent or misleading. The feel of two (more or less) identical pairs of stock-
ings against my fingers, or their appearance when held up to the light, is surely quite 
similar.20 It appears that subjects misapprehend or misremember their own states of 
perceptual consciousness when they explain their evaluations.
 19 This is not to deny that verbal reports of mental processes are somewhat more accurate in real time than 
after the fact (Ericsson and Simon 1993).
 20 I will here leave aside the important possibility that subjects in the grip of a position effect uncon-
sciously manipulated the stockings in such a way as to confirm a prior bias toward the right-hand pair, e.g., 
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We thus have two problems: lack of introspective awareness of mental processes, 
and misleading introspective access to or memory of mental states. I propose that we 
tackle these problems separately.
2.4 Introspective Awareness of Perceptual States
When people attempt to give verbal explanations for their preferences, this causes the 
quality of those preferences to deteriorate. But another avenue may be more promis-
ing: learning to pay closer attention to occurrent perceptual states. Notoriously, we fil-
ter huge amounts of incoming perceptual data out of explicit consciousness, even when 
we are behaviourally responding to some of it. But it is possible to bring into awareness 
states that we have previously glossed over.21 A number of Buddhist-derived medi-
tation practices are devoted to bringing more of our experiential states into explicit 
consciousness while suspending the evaluative mechanisms that tend to distort our 
awareness. The aim of mindfulness meditation is to maintain non-judgemental 
awareness of all aspects of one’s experience, including perceptions, bodily sensations, 
thoughts, and feelings. Long-standing claims by meditators about improvements in 
their perceptual acuity, attention, and cognitive processing have been increasingly val-
idated through empirical research, though further investigation is needed.22
Mindfulness techniques improve ability to detect stimuli and accurately identify their 
properties. They reduce attentional blink, or the period of time after stimulus detection 
before a similar stimulus can be detected again (Brown et al. 1984a, 1984b; May et al. 2011; 
Slagter et al. 2007; Slagter et al. 2009), improve the speed of encoding of visual infor-
mation, thus allowing subjects to detect stimuli of shorter duration (Brown et al. 1984a, 
1984b; Jensen et al. 2012), and improve reaction times to auditory stimuli (Lutz et al. 
2009). They improve critical flicker fusion frequency, a measure of visual acuity reflect-
ing one’s ability to detect that a figure is flickering rather than steady (Manjunath and 
Telles 1999; Raghuraj and Telles 2002; Telles et al. 1995, 2007; see Cahn and Polich 2006 
for discussion). They also reduce susceptibility to optical illusion (Telles et al. 1997, 2007).
On attention-related tasks, mindfulness techniques improve performance, shorten 
response times, and reduce error rates (Jensen et al. 2012; Jha et al. 2007; Semple 2010; 
van den Hurk et al. 2010). They also improve working memory (Jensen et al. 2012) and 
executive function, which refers to cognitive processes that govern other cognitive pro-
cesses, such as the switching of attention from one task to another (Zeidan et al. 2010).
Some of the most promising results are from sport psychology. Moore (2009) and 
Gardner and Moore (2012) review findings that athletes trained in mindfulness improve 
on measures of attention as well as performance. Many studies found improvements in 
by stretching the stockings more thinly and then pronouncing on their superior sheerness. The discussion of 
mindfulness below offers hope that subjects could learn not to engage in such manipulations.
 21 See also Irvin (2008a).
 22 In this brief summary I include only intervention studies, not correlational or case studies.
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performance, operationalized as coach ratings of performance (Gardner and Moore 
2007), objective performance on training equipment (Fernández García et al. 2004), 
and national rankings (Bernier et al. 2009). Other studies suggest mechanisms of perfor-
mance improvement: Hasker (2010) found improvements in ‘ability to describe and to 
be non-reactive towards . . . internal experiences’ and ‘increased experiential acceptance’, 
which is related to a reduction in avoidance of negative experiences (p. iv); Thompson 
et al. (2011) found improved ability to act with awareness and reduced task-related wor-
ries and task-irrelevant cognitions. Finally, in analysis of a study unrelated to sports 
performance, Kass et al. (2011) suggest, ‘Mindfulness training may greatly impact actual 
driving performance over time by improving drivers’ awareness of their environment 
and enabling them to block out distractions and to quickly identify hazards’ (p. 236).
How are these results relevant for our purposes? Mindfulness training enhances 
perceptual acuity and speeds processing, making it more likely that people will accu-
rately detect the features of an object. It increases awareness of one’s inner experiences 
and improves working memory. All of these effects have promise for combatting 
coarse-grainedness: if one is better able to detect the features of the object and one’s 
own perceptual experiences, and better able to hold this information in mind, one is 
more likely to be responsive to the relevant features of the object. Mindfulness train-
ing also improves executive function, reducing the attention paid to distractions and 
enhancing focus on relevant information. This has clear promise for combatting the 
problem of irrelevance. Moreover, these improvements in acuity and attention have 
pay-offs for athletic performance, which further supports the idea that mindfulness 
training enables subjects to detect and maintain focus on relevant rather than irrel-
evant aspects of their inner and outer experience.
Obviously, these results are suggestive rather than decisive when it comes to aesthetic 
judgement. To my knowledge, no studies have measured whether mindfulness train-
ing enhances one’s ability to notice and respond to the aesthetically relevant features of 
a poem or painting. But the mounting evidence in other domains invites the hypothe-
sis that the cognitive, perceptual, and attentional effects of mindfulness training would 
enhance aesthetic judgement. Assuming that our perceptual states themselves are not 
massively misleading as indicators of the entities being perceived—and nothing in the 
research calling introspection into question suggests that they are—perceptual mind-
fulness seems to be right sort of thing to allow us to appreciate artworks in the way that 
Carroll requires, by attending with understanding to their formal features, and to be 
in the aesthetic state of mind as Iseminger requires, by tracking the work’s formal and 
aesthetic features and valuing the very experience of thus tracking them.
2.5 Deep Aesthetic Appreciation and Awareness of 
Mental Processes
Mindfulness training might allow us to develop greater awareness of our occurrent 
thoughts and emotional states as well as perceptual states, and this would have the 
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potential to inform us about the interrelations, in our own minds, of elements of 
perception, cognition, and emotion. But will this be sufficient for views that seem 
to require awareness of how our mental processes function? Even if we can develop 
greater awareness of our occurrent perceptual, cognitive, and emotional states, it 
appears that without access to underlying processes or the ability to run controlled 
experiments on ourselves, any such information we might obtain will be only corre-
lational, not causal. And some of the accounts we have considered seem to require 
information about how our responses are caused. One variety of aesthetic experience, 
on Carroll’s account, is attention with understanding ‘to the ways in which [the work’s 
formal and aesthetic properties] engage our sensibilities and imagination’ (Carroll 
2002: 167). Kieran suggests that part of appreciating an artwork is appreciating ‘the 
ways in which the artistry shapes and guides our responses’ (Kieran 2005: 213). These 
are clearly causal notions.23
But I suggest that invoking an external theory about how one’s own responses and 
those of others are produced, as part of one’s deep appreciation of an artwork, is not, 
in fact, such a troubling thing. For deep appreciation is aimed at identifying values in a 
work that are accessible intersubjectively, not merely to the individual appreciator. To 
deeply appreciate a work is not merely to be sensitive to how it affects me: for my own 
responses may be grounded in or dependent on idiosyncrasies in my own experiences 
or perceptual mechanisms. To the extent that this is true, a work that is very valuable to 
me may not be very valuable simpliciter, and identifying the mechanisms whereby the 
work produces idiosyncratic responses is not germane to deep appreciation.
When we consider Carroll’s and Kieran’s accounts in relation to the idea of deep 
appreciation, then, we should take seriously their use of the plural: it is how the work 
‘engages our sensibilities and imagination’, ‘shapes and guides our responses’, that is at 
issue. And an accurate theory of how responses are produced by various aspects of the 
artwork, abetted by observations of one’s own states that are consistent with the theory, 
may be just the right sort of thing to invoke here.
We might wonder whether explanation-induced instability and deterioration will 
follow upon attempts to understand and explain our responses in these ways. If we 
attempt to bring external theories to bear in understanding our responses, will this 
change our preferences, and in objectionable ways? The experimental results I have 
discussed don’t give us insight into this, since they involve subjects who attempted to 
introspectively observe or recollect their mental processes without appeal to accurate 
theories.
It stands to reason that bringing accurate theories to bear will sometimes alter our 
judgements. If I become aware of position effects on judgement, I may be in a posi-
tion to attend especially carefully to the features of the object in order to avoid being 
 23 But recall that on Kieran’s view, perhaps one need only know that the work has caused one’s responses 
and not how.
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influenced by such effects.24 This sort of judgement instability is hardly objectionable: it 
is a straightforward improvement. The greatest worry, perhaps, is that my immersive 
experience may be compromised by my attempts to observe, in real time, how particu-
lar features of the work affect me. If, in watching a scene in a movie, I am attending to 
the extremely slow zoom in on a character’s face in relation to a theory about how this 
manoeuvre evokes emotion, this may disrupt my emotional response.
If I am relying on an accurate theory of how people’s responses are produced by par-
ticular aspects of the artwork, should it matter that I myself do not experience the rel-
evant response? Should I not simply be able to attend to the artwork and cross-reference 
its features with my theory in order to detect how it shapes and guides ‘our’ responses 
in general? Worries about particularism suggest that one’s actually having the response 
is important: in the absence of the response, it is always possible that the response that 
would typically be evoked by a given element has been disabled or reversed, within the 
context of this particular work, by some other factor that one’s theory has not taken into 
account.25 In so far as aesthetic appreciation is thought to be experiential, having the 
response is necessary. And if one’s aesthetic response is hindered, one is not having as 
strong or satisfying an experience as one otherwise would, which is undesirable in itself.
I see two possibilities to mitigate the worry that applying theoretical knowledge to a 
work will undermine aesthetic responses. First, it may be that theoretical knowledge 
about how particular aspects of a work affect our responses is disruptive when first 
acquired, but over time can come to coexist with responses that are restored to, or even 
enhanced relative to, their initial intensity.26 Second, there may be more than one mode 
in which a work can be experienced, and it may be possible to learn to shift among 
these modes. It may be possible to experience a work immersively, experiencing and 
enjoying the effects it produces on us, and then later to experience it more analytically, 
with specific attention to the aspects that our theoretical knowledge tells us should be 
operative in producing our responses.
2.6 Conclusion
To sum up: aesthetic experience, appropriately construed, is not threatened by the 
problems I enumerated above. This is because an experience need not include an accu-
rate grasp of its object to be aesthetic.
(Mere) aesthetic appreciation, which in my view does require a sufficiently accu-
rate grasp of its object but does not require attention to one’s own mental states or 
 24 While I know of no studies testing this hypothesis in relation to position effects, Beaman et al. (1978) 
demonstrate that awareness of the bystander effect reduces its power.
 25 As Sibley (1959, 1974) observes, a feature that is good-making in one context may be neutral or even 
bad-making in another; and the factors that influence the feature’s valence may be so complex that it is 
impossible to spell out what they are.
 26 DeBellis (1995) explores in depth the relation between the non-conceptual listening of ordinary, musi-
cally untrained listeners and the conceptual listening of trained listeners to music, concluding that training 
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processes, is threatened by irrelevance and coarse-grainedness. However, to the extent 
that these problems rear their heads in unusual cases, this need not worry us exceed-
ingly. Also, mindfulness training may mitigate these problems, helping us to grasp 
objects more accurately while weeding out distorting factors.
Deep aesthetic appreciation is threatened by all of the problems, because deep 
appreciation requires understanding of how our responses are produced by the work. 
However, introspection of one’s own mental processes, which is seriously called into 
question by the empirical work, may not be required. Introspective access to the flow 
of one’s occurrent perceptual, cognitive, and emotional states, combined with accurate 
theoretical knowledge about causal relations between aspects of a work and people’s 
responses, may be sufficient to allow us to assess the work’s merits as deep appreciation 
requires. This may involve the cultivation of particular kinds of cognitive skills, such 
as the ability to shift between modes of experience of a work. As long as it is possible 
to acquire such skills—and the empirical results surveyed here provide no reason to 
doubt this—deep appreciation will turn out to be challenging, but attainable.
What, then, is the ultimate impact of the empirical findings on the contemporary 
views of aesthetic experience and appreciation with which I  began? Take, again, 
Kieran’s (2005: 213) claim, ‘When we truly appreciate a work, we appreciate its pictorial 
composition, the arc of the lines, the shading, the foreshadowing, the ways in which 
the artistry shapes and guides our responses.’ Kieran’s claim falls under my notion of 
deep appreciation. If his requirement that we appreciate ‘the ways in which the art-
istry shapes and guides our responses’ were a requirement for introspective awareness 
of these matters, it would be threatened by the empirical findings. However, if it is 
possible to appreciate these matters by applying theoretical knowledge about mental 
processes to introspective awareness of our states, then Kieran’s view, even on a strong 
reading of his requirement, survives the empirical challenge.
Carroll (2002: 167) says that ‘attention with understanding . . . to the ways in which 
[the work’s formal and aesthetic properties] engage our sensibilities and imagina-
tion’ is one variety of aesthetic experience. I agree that this sort of attention could 
figure in aesthetic experience or mere aesthetic appreciation, though I take it to be 
required only for deep appreciation. Carroll’s condition is similar to Kieran’s, and the 
impact of the empirical challenge is similar as well: if Carroll means, here, to require 
direct introspective awareness of these processes, that may turn out to be impossi-
ble for many or most of us; but if a theoretical grasp of processes, combined with 
introspective awareness of occurrent states, is sufficient, then this variety of aesthetic 
experience remains possible, though perhaps challenging to achieve. Because Carroll 
requires ‘attention with understanding’ for this variety of aesthetic experience, it is 
not clear that the cocktail of theoretical knowledge of processes and introspective 
awareness of the flow of occurrent states would satisfy him. But perhaps ‘attention’ 
to the occurrent states, combined with ‘understanding’ of processes at a theoretical 
level, could do the trick.
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Iseminger (2005: 99) suggests that ‘[s] omeone is appreciating a state of affairs just in 
case she or he is valuing for its own sake the experiencing of that state of affairs . . .’. In so 
far as experiencing a state of affairs involves having a sufficiently accurate grasp of it, 
Iseminger’s notion will map onto my notion of aesthetic appreciation. It appears that 
a grasp of the flow of one’s occurrent states, even without a grasp of the processes by 
which they are produced, may be sufficient to count as experiencing of a state of affairs, 
as long as those occurrent states don’t mislead one regarding the state of affairs; and 
there is no obvious barrier to valuing this flow of occurrent states. If it is possible to 
gain greater introspective access to our perceptual states through mindfulness tech-
niques, thereby staving off irrelevance effects, aesthetic appreciation in Iseminger’s 
sense is safeguarded.
Levinson (forthcoming) says, ‘Aesthetic experience is experience involving aesthetic 
perception of some object, grounded in aesthetic attention to the object, and in which 
there is a positive hedonic, affective or evaluative response to the perception itself or the 
content of that perception.’27 If the requirement of ‘aesthetic attention to the object’ is 
strict, this is a notion of aesthetic appreciation; if not, it is an account of aesthetic expe-
rience. The empirical results don’t give us deep reason to worry that we can’t be aware 
of the content of our perception, or of the perception itself. The principal worry about 
Levinson’s account is that the empirical results suggest a difficulty with knowing just 
what our ‘hedonic, affective or evaluative response’ is a response to: are we responding 
to the content of our perception, or is something else (e.g., a position effect) contribut-
ing to our response? This suggests not that aesthetic experience (or appreciation) is 
impossible, but that it may be difficult to know whether we are fulfilling the conditions 
for aesthetic experience or appreciation. I will not attempt here to assess how troubled 
we should be by this epistemic difficulty.
In sum, these accounts can be interpreted in such a way as to make their respective 
varieties of aesthetic experience or appreciation possible, given the empirical results. 
For some theories, this involves embracing theoretical, rather than introspective, 
awareness of mental processes. Whether their proponents would endorse these inter-
pretations, however, is another question.28
References
Beaman, Arthur L. et  al. (1978). ‘Increasing Helping Rates through Information 
Dissemination: Teaching Pays’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4: 406–11.
Bell, Clive (1914). Art. London: Chatto and Windus.
ultimately enhances (rather than detracting from) the listener’s ability to hear, and thus respond to, the fine 
details available in the music.
 27 Italics in original.
 28 I am grateful to Matthew Kieran and Jon Robson for helpful feedback on an earlier draft, to the volume 
editors for an invitation to the 2011 Challenges to Humanism: Character, Appreciation, and Value workshop 
in London, and to participants in the workshop for helpful discussion.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Jan 31 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199669639.indd   53 1/31/2014   6:56:09 PM
54 Irvin
Bem, Daryl J. and H. Keith McConnell (1970). ‘Testing the Self-Perception Explanation of 
Dissonance Phenomena: On the Salience of Premanipulation Attitudes’, Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 14: 271–80.
Bergeron, Vincent and Dominic McIver Lopes (2012). ‘Aesthetic Theory and Aesthetic 
Science: Prospects for Integration’, in Arthur P. Shimamura and Stephen E. Palmer (eds), Aesthetic 
Science: Connecting Minds, Brains, and Experience. New York: Oxford University Press, 63–79.
Bernier, Marjorie et al. (2009). ‘Mindfulness and Acceptance Approaches in Sport Performance’, 
Journal of Clinical Sport Psychology, 25: 320–33.
Brown, Daniel et al. (1984a). ‘Differences in Visual Sensitivity among Mindfulness Meditators and 
Non-Meditators’, Perceptual and Motor Skills, 58: 727–33.
Brown, Daniel et  al. (1984b). ‘Visual Sensitivity and Mindfulness Meditation’, Perceptual and 
Motor Skills, 58: 775–84.
Cahn, B. Rael and John Polich (2006). ‘Meditation States and Traits: EEG, ERP, and Neuroimaging 
Studies’, Psychological Bulletin, 132: 180–211.
Carlson, Kurt A. and Samuel D. Bond (2006). ‘Improving Preference Assessment: Limiting the 
Effect of Context through Pre-Exposure to Attribute Levels’, Management Science, 52: 410–21.
Carroll, Noël (1993). ‘On Being Moved by Nature:  Between Religion and Natural History’, 
in Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (eds), Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 244–66.
Carroll, Noël (2002). ‘Aesthetic Experience Revisited’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 42: 145–68.
Coupey, Eloise et al. (1998). ‘Product Category Familiarity and Preference Construction’, Journal 
of Consumer Research, 24: 459–68.
Cutting, James (2003). ‘Gustave Caillebotte, French Impressionism, and Mere Exposure’, 
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 10: 319–43.
DeBellis, Mark (1995). Music and Conceptualization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ericsson, Karl A. and Herbert A. Simon (1993). Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data, rev. 
edn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fernández García, R. et al. (2004). ‘Efecto de la hipnosis y la terapia de aceptación y compro-
miso (ACT) en la mejora de la fuerza física en piragüistas’, International Journal of Clinical and 
Health Psychology, 4: 481–93.
Fleming, Stephen M. et al. (2010). ‘Relating Introspective Accuracy to Individual Differences in 
Brain Structure’, Science, 329: 1541–3.
Gardner, Frank L. and Zella E. Moore (2007). The Psychology of Human Performance:  The 
Mindfulness-Acceptance-Commitment Approach. New York: Springer.
Gardner, Frank L. and Zella E. Moore (2012). ‘Mindfulness and Acceptance Models in Sport 
Psychology: A Decade of Basic and Applied Scientific Advancements’, Canadian Psychology, 
53: 309–18.
Goethals, George R. and Richard F. Reckman (1973). ‘The Perception of Consistency in Attitudes’, 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 9: 491–501.
Hall, Lars and Petter Johansson (2008). ‘Using Choice Blindness to Study Decision Making and 
Introspection’, in P. Gärdenfors and A. Wallin (eds), Cognition: A Smorgasbord of Cognitive 
Science. Nora: Nya Doxa, 267–83.
Hasker, S. M. (2010). ‘Evaluation of the Mindfulness-Acceptance Commitment (MAC) 
Approach for Enhancing Athletic Performance’. Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University of 
Pennsylvania, Indiana, PA.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Jan 31 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199669639.indd   54 1/31/2014   6:56:10 PM
Is Aesthetic Experience Possible? 55
Hume, David (1757/1985). ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ in Eugene F. Miller (ed), Essays Moral, 
Political and Literary. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 226–49.
Hurk, Paul A. M. van den et al. (2010). ‘Greater Efficiency in Attentional Processing Related to 
Mindfulness Meditation’, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63: 1168–80.
Irvin, Sherri (2008a). ‘Scratching an Itch’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 66: 25–35.
Irvin, Sherri (2008b). ‘The Pervasiveness of the Aesthetic in Ordinary Experience’, British Journal 
of Aesthetics, 48: 29–44.
Iseminger, Gary (2005). ‘The Aesthetic State of Mind’, in M. Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates 
in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112.
Jensen, Christian Gaden et al. (2012). ‘Mindfulness Training Affects Attention—Or is it Attentional 
Effort?’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141: 106–23.
Jha, Amishi P. et al. (2007). ‘Mindfulness Training Modifies Subsystems of Attention’, Cognitive, 
Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7: 109–19.
Johansson, Petter et al. (2005). ‘Failure to Detect Mismatches between Intention and Outcome in a 
Simple Decision Task’, Science, 310: 116–19.
Kass, Steven J. et al. (2011). ‘Effects of Mindfulness Training on Simulated Driving: Preliminary 
Results’, Mindfulness, 2: 236–41.
Kieran, Matthew (2005). Revealing Art. London: Routledge.
Kieran, Matthew, Aaron Meskin, and Margaret Moore (unpublished). ‘Mere Exposure to 
Bad Art’.
Latané, Bibb and John M. Darley (1970). The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? 
New York: Appleton-Century Crofts.
Levinson, Jerrold (2014). ‘Toward a Non-Minimalist Conception of Aesthetic Experience’, in 
Aesthetics Pursuits: Essays in Philosophy of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Li, Ye and Nicholas Epley (2009). ‘When the Best Appears to be Saved for Last: Serial Position 
Effects on Choice’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22: 378–89.
Locher, Paul et al. (2007). ‘Visual Interest in Pictorial Art during an Aesthetic Experience’, Spatial 
Vision, 21: 55–77.
Lutz, Antoine et  al. (2009). ‘Mental Training Enhances Attentional Stability:  Neural and 
Behavioral Evidence’, Journal of Neuroscience, 29: 13418–27.
Maier, Norman R. F. (1931). ‘Reasoning in Humans II: The Solution of a Problem and its Appearance 
in Consciousness’, Journal of Comparative Psychology, 12: 181–94.
Manjunath, N. K. and Shirley Telles (1999). ‘Improvement in Visual Perceptual Sensitivity in 
Children Following Yoga Training’, Journal of Indian Psychology, 17: 41–5.
Mantonakis, Antonia et al. (2009). ‘Order in Choice Effects of Serial Position on Preferences’, 
Psychological Science, 20: 1309–12.
May, Christopher J. et al. (2011). ‘Short-Term Training in Loving-Kindness Meditation Produces a 
State, But Not a Trait, Alteration of Attention’, Mindfulness, 2: 143–53.
McLaughlin, John P. et al. (1983). ‘Aesthetic Preference in Dextrals and Sinistrals’, Neuropsychologia, 
21: 147–53.
Moore, Zella E. (2009). ‘Theoretical and Empirical Developments of the Mindfulness-Acceptance-
Commitment (MAC) Approach to Performance Enhancement’, Journal of Clinical Sport 
Psychology, 25: 291–302.
Nisbett, Richard and Timothy Wilson (1977). ‘Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports of 
Mental Processes’, Psychological Review, 84: 231–59.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Jan 31 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199669639.indd   55 1/31/2014   6:56:10 PM
56 Irvin
Raghuraj, P. and Shirley Telles (2002). ‘Improvement in Spatial and Temporal Measures of Visual 
Perception Following Yoga Training’, Journal of Indian Psychology, 20: 23–31.
Semple, Randye J. (2010). ‘Does Mindfulness Meditation Enhance Attention? A  Randomized 
Controlled Trial’, Mindfulness, 1: 121–30.
Shusterman, Richard (1991). ‘Form and Funk: The Aesthetic Challenge of Popular Art’, British 
Journal of Aesthetics, 31: 203–13.
Sibley, Frank (1959). ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, Philosophical Review, 68: 421–50.
Sibley, Frank (1974). ‘Particularity, Art and Evaluation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
supp. 48: 1–21.
Slagter, Heleen A. et al. (2007). ‘Mental Training Affects Distribution of Limited Brain Resources’, 
PLoS Biology, 5: 1228–35.
Slagter, Heleen A. et al. (2009). ‘Theta Phase Synchrony and Conscious Target Perception: Impact 
of Intensive Mental Training’, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21: 1536–49.
Telles, Shirley et al. (1995). ‘Improvement in Visual Perception Following Yoga Training’, Journal of 
Indian Psychology, 13: 30–2.
Telles, Shirley et al. (1997). ‘A Combination of Focusing and Defocusing through Yoga Reduces 
Optical Illusion More than Focusing Alone’, Indian Journal of Physiology and Pharmacology, 
41: 179–82.
Telles, Shirley et al. (2007). ‘Effect of Yoga on Visual Perception and Visual Strain’, Journal of 
Modern Optics, 54: 1379–83.
Thompson, Rachel W. et  al. (2011). ‘One Year Follow-Up of Mindful Sport Performance 
Enhancement (MSPE) with Archers, Golfers, and Runners’, Journal of Clinical Sport Psychology, 
5: 99–116.
Wilson, Timothy D. et  al. (1993). ‘Introspecting about Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice 
Satisfaction’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19: 331–9.
Wilson, Timothy D. and Jonathan W. Schooler (1991). ‘Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can 
Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
60: 181–92.
Yamada, Ayumi (2009). ‘Appreciating Art Verbally: Verbalization Can Make a Work of Art Be 
Both Undeservedly Loved and Unjustly Maligned’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
45: 1140–3.
Zeidan, Fadel et al. (2010). ‘Mindfulness Meditation Improves Cognition: Evidence of Brief Mental 
Training’, Consciousness and Cognition, 19: 597–605.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Jan 31 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199669639.indd   56 1/31/2014   6:56:10 PM
